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RICHARD S. KAY*
Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in
American Law
There is no single American law on causing death for compas-
sionate reasons. The federal distribution of powers leaves the rele-
vant areas of law mainly to the states. Federal constitutional law has
been invoked only in connection with the outer limits within which
state law may govern. So far it has not been successfully employed to
invalidate state regulation. Consequently, there are at least 50 laws
dealing with end-of-life decisions. Nevertheless, the basic organiza-
tion of the legal issues has turned out to be similar in almost all
American jurisdictions and I will treat the subject generally. It is
important to be mindful, however, that, in this respect. I have
adopted a significant simplification in order to facilitate exposition.
I. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMPASSIONATE DEATH
Like every modern society, the United States has struggled with
end-of-life problems. Medical science is now capable of maintaining
heart and lung function and some brain activity-and, therefore, life,
as defined in law-even in people incapable of the simplest human
activities.' The same technology maintains the lives of competent
terminally ill people suffering extreme pain, discomfort and loss of
dignity. Sometimes, it is understandable that individuals, families
and physicians may judge death to be an improvement.
There is evidence that, in such cases, patients and other con-
cerned parties are acting on that judgment by removing "life-sus-
taining" devices such as ventilators or feeding tubes. Such actions are
lawful throughout the United States, if made by the appropriate per-
sons, for specified reasons, using the right procedures. Beyond this,
in a non-trivial number of cases, patients, their doctors or their fam-
ily members appear to be acting affirmatively to end lives, something
that, except in one jurisdiction, is always unlawful. A survey of al-
* George and Helen England Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School
of Law. I am grateful to Carol Weisbrod for valuable advice and to Robert Dunn and
Carrie Field for helpful research and editing assistance.
1. Approximately 30 states have adopted statutes recognizing "brain death," es-
sentially irreversible cessation of all brain function. This replaced definitions turning
on the cessation of heartbeat or breathing. THE LAw DICTIONARY, LEXIS, Anderson
Publishing Co. (2002).
693
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
most 2000 physicians found that 18 percent were willing to violate
the law by prescribing lethal drugs or administering lethal
injections. 2
It is reasonable to believe that physician-assisted suicide, as well
as active euthanasia, occurs in hundreds if not thousands of cases
every year. Yet there are few prosecutions. In cases where all the
relevant parties are in accord, it is understandable that law enforce-
ment authorities never hear of these deaths.3 Only rarely do prose-
cutors choose to initiate legal proceedings even when such cases are
brought to their attention.4 In the small number of cases when doc-
tors are brought to trial, convictions turn out to be exceptional. Juries
sometimes ignore judges' instructions and revert to a more rudimen-
tary sense of right and wrong.5 And, in the few cases of conviction for
euthanasia or assisting suicide in the kinds of circumstances dis-
cussed, lenient sentencing is common.6
II. HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE
It is not a sufficient defense in a homicide persecution to prove
that the killing was undertaken with a benign motive. The "malice
aforethought" required for a murder conviction is a term of art and
does not refer to hostility toward the victim. 7 Similarly, a defense of
consent is unavailable in a homicide prosecution.8 Taking life is not a
mere private wrong. Common law presumed that an individual's life
belonged as much to God as to the person him or herself. In listing
the prohibitions of the natural law that preceded organized society,
Locke mentioned first the prohibition against taking life, reasoning
that men were "[H] is property, whose workmanship they are, made to
last during His, not another's pleasure."9
2. Diane E. Meier, et.al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1193 (1998). Another
study reported that 22.5% of oncologists surveyed supported, and 14.5% had actually
participated in, causing such deaths. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, et.al., Attitudes and Prac-
tices of U.S. Oncologists Regarding Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide, 133
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 527, 529 (2000). The attitudes of physicians appear to
vary by specialty. Meier, supra at 1199. A survey of physicians treating AIDS pa-
tients showed much larger percentages who supported, and who had approved, pa-
tient requests for lethal prescriptions. Lee R. Slome, et.al., Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Patients with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Disease, 336 NEW. ENG. J.
MED. 417, 419-20 (1997).
3. See generally Stephen J. Ziegler, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Criminal
Prosecution: Are Physicians at Risk? 33 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 349 (2005).
4. Id. at 355.
5. See Julia Pugliese, Don't Ask - Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J., 1291, 1298-99.
6. Id.
7. E.g. People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1966).
8. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997). For a recent state-
ment see Sanders v. Wyoming, 7 P.3d 891, 894-95 (Wyo. 2000).
9. JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOL-
ERATION 6 (Charles Sherman ed., Appleton-Century Crofts 1937) (1689).
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Therefore, no exception to the homicide law was made for sui-
cide. The objections to consent as a defense to homicide apply: An
individual's life is not solely his or her own concern. Individuals are
not authorized to deprive the king or society of their presence in the
world. Destruction of one's own life is an affront to God who is the
sole judge of life and death. Blackstone called suicide a "double of-
fence; one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and
rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for, the other temporal,
against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all of his
subjects . . . ."1o It is apparent that legal hostility to suicide has al-
ways been tied to basically religious ideas of the inviolability of
human life, an association that has continued to the present, some-
times expressed overtly and sometimes implicitly.
The crime of suicide was imported into the American legal sys-
tems with the rest of the common law. Suicide had two penal conse-
quences. The suicide's body was subjected to an "ignominious
burial." This generally consisted of burial at a crossroads on the
highway with a stake driven through the body. Second, the personal
(although not the real) property of the suicide was confiscated. The
obvious criticisms of these punishments-as a senseless superstition
in one case and as unjust to the heirs of the suicide in the other-led
to their early modification. By the end of the eighteenth century pun-
ishments for suicide were widely abandoned. Several states enacted
explicit prohibitions on using them."
The withdrawal of penalties for suicide, however, did not imme-
diately extend to attempted suicide. There, the wrongdoer was still
available for punishment. As late as 1961, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court affirmed the misdemeanor conviction of a defendant
who survived "slashing and cutting his throat and . . . hanging him-
self from a barn rafter." The court did sheepishly point out that such
offenders might be placed on probation or remitted to appropriate
"state facilities and services."12 Most jurisdictions, however, have
long treated attempted suicide as indication of mental illness not
criminality. The Commentary to the Model Penal Code found it im-
plausible to suppose that criminal sanctions would deter many people
set on suicide and it found that criminalization exhibited a "certain
moral extravagance."13 Prosecutions for attempting suicide have
now entirely disappeared.14
In contrast, over the same period, the criminality of assisting a
suicide has been reinforced. Unlike suicide and attempted suicide-
10. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 Commentaries *189.
11. Thomas Marzen, et.al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1,
67-69 (1985).
12. State v. Willis, 121 S.E. 2d 854, 857 (N.C. 1961).
13. Quoted in In re Joseph G, 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal.1983).
14. John F. Kennedy Mem'1 Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (N.J. 1971).
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an actual offender is present and the presumption of mental incapac-
ity is inapt.15 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court noted that
46 states, the District of Columbia and two territories had laws
against assisted suicide.' 6 Such laws, however, did not impose the
severe penalties attached to homicide.' 7
Over time, therefore, suicide and participation in suicide have
been viewed as less and less culpable. Nevertheless, court after court
has repeated that the law still regards decisions to end human life,
with or without the assent of the individual involved, as profoundly
anti-social. The decisions not to punish actions associated with sui-
cide are explained as motivated by concerns apart from and despite
its fundamentally immoral character. The United States Supreme
Court's in Washington v. Glucksberg in 1997 reflected the prevalent
judicial attitude: "[O]pposition to and condemnation of suicide-and,
therefore, of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes
of our philosophical, legal and cultural heritages." 8 In that judg-
ment the Court held that the right to personal autonomy associated
with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
did not encompass a right to end one's own life.19
The only prominent exception is Oregon's 1999 adoption of the
Right to Death With Dignity Act. This legislation establishes a right
to cause one's own death in strictly defined circumstances. It creates
an elaborate procedure to ensure the considered and voluntary na-
ture of the action. In the first six years in which the Act was in effect,
265 lethal prescriptions were reported, of which 171 were used to
commit suicide. 20 The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
Act against a claim by the federal government that it was inconsis-
tent with federal law regulating the prescription of drugs by physi-
cians.21 While the legal grounds of this litigation concern only issues
of federalism and statutory construction, the interest of the current
15. In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 631 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
16. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711; See also Marzen, supra note 11 at 73-77.
17. In re Joseph G, 667 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Cal. 1983).
18. 521 U.S. at 711.
19. Id. at 776-77. The autonomy right mentioned is commonly referred to as a
right to "privacy". See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 784-787 (Aspen Law & Business 2d ed. 2002). Arguments for such a consti-
tutional right have been a persistent feature of the academic literature for many
years. See, e.g. Edward M. Kay, Right to Die 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 591 (1965-66) (associ-
ating such a right with the Ninth Amendment); David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians:
Physician-Assisted Suicide After Glucksberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 161 (as-
sociating it with the Fourteenth Amendment.). For extended arguments to the con-
trary see Marzen, supra note 11 at 105-107.
20. Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 21 CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED.179,
185 (2005).
21. Gonzales v. Oregon, No. 04-623, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 767 (Jan. 17, 2006).
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federal administration in pursuing it is generally assumed to be its
hostility to state approval of any form of suicide. 22
III. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT
Notwithstanding the almost uniform rejection of any right of sui-
cide, many judicial opinions confirm the legality of actions by health
providers and others undertaken to end the suffering of grievously
impaired patients by discontinuing the treatments or procedures that
are keeping them alive. These judgments emphatically reject the
suggestion that they condone a right to die. They rest on a different
right-the right to control one's own body and, more specifically, to
refuse or to discontinue medical treatment.
This right is well settled in common law. In a much cited dictum,
Judge Cardozo (as he was then) affirmed that an unauthorized sur-
gery was an actionable trespass: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his pa-
tient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages."23 From this it follows that a patient has the right to refuse any
procedure and, by the same reasoning, to require it to be discontin-
ued. Most state legislation on termination of life-saving procedures,
as will be discussed in the next section, are directed at the problem of
making such decisions for incompetents. But, in protecting the right
to discontinue treatment for an incompetent person, they presuppose
(and sometimes explicitly state) that the same right is enjoyed by
competent persons.24
This common law right has now been widely recognized as con-
stitutionally protected. In 1990, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health the United States Supreme Court confirmed
Missouri's right to forbid termination of life-preserving treatment
without clear evidence that the incompetent patient, when compe-
tent, had expressed a preference for such a course of action. The
Court assumed, but did not hold, that the right to refuse treatment
was part of the liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment requires not
22. Department of Justice Press Release, Assistant Attorney General Mccallum's
Statement Regarding the District Court Ruling on Assisted Suicide in Oregon, http://
www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2002/April/02-ag_231.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) (stating
"a just and caring society should do its best to assist in coping with the problems that
afflict the terminally ill. It should not abandon or assist in killing them").
23. Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
24. See e.g. W.VA. CODE. § 16-30(2)(b)(1) (2005) (stating "Common law tradition
and the medical profession in general have traditionally recognized the right of a ca-
pable adult to accept or reject medical or surgical intervention affecting one's own
medical condition").
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be infringed without special justification. 2 5 State cases have cited
both common law and constitutional bases for the right. Little seems
to hinge on which source is emphasized. 26
The right to refuse treatment effectively empowers a terminal
patient in distress to discontinue the processes prolonging his or her
life. In neither common law nor constitutional form, however, is the
right absolute. Courts have recognized several countervailing state
interests that might be invoked to block its exercise. Those interests
fall under four headings: (1) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession; (2) the protection of the interests of innocent
third parties; (3) the preservation of life; and (4) the prevention of
suicide. 27 I will briefly discuss the first three in the following
paragraphs, deferring consideration of the last, preventing suicide,
until the next section.
(1) Maintaining the Ethical Integrity of the Medical Profession
The interest in the integrity of the medical profession was impor-
tant to the Supreme Court of New Jersey in upholding the appoint-
ment of a guardian for an accident victim who was a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses. The guardian was empowered to, and did, con-
sent on her behalf to a blood transfusion necessary to save her life.2 8
The court found that hospitals and doctors were the "involuntary
hosts" of severely ill patients. Doctors are committed by their profes-
sions to "to aid the sick and injured." They are "consecrated to pre-
serving life." To require them to perform surgery in circumstances
that unnecessarily endanger the patient's life is to put them under an
unacceptable strain. Refusing treatment also requires health care
providers to make difficult judgments about the competence of pa-
tients-and to risk civil liability if they guess wrong.29 In most cases,
however, the state's interest in the integrity of the medical profession
has been easily dismissed. Courts cite ample material showing that
professional standards actually approve acceding to a patient's re-
quest to end treatment. In addition, they hold that the individual's
25. 497 U.S. 261, 278-80, 282 (1990). What the court said was "The principle that
a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id. at 278.
26. Compare In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (constitutional) with In re
Longway, 549 N.E. 2d 292 (Ill. 1990) (common law).
27. The most frequently cited authority for this categorization is Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977). See, e.g.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271. I have altered the order in which the Saikewicz court
presented the interests for the purpose of exposition.
28. John F. Kennedy Mem'1 Hosp., 279 A. 2d at 671. The refusal had been ex-
pressed at the time by the patient's mother. Id. at 671. Another aspect of this argu-
ment is that the involvement of the physician in causing the death of the patient
undercuts patients' confidence, possibly endangering public health. Sampson & Doe v.
State, 31 P.3d 88, 96 (Alaska 2001).
29. JOHN F. KENNEDY MEM'L Hosp. 297 A.2d at 673.
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right to refuse is more important, and outweighs, the physician's in-
terest in maintaining nice ethical principles.30
(2) The Protection of the Interests of Innocent Third Parties
The state interest in the protection of third parties has typically
been invoked in the case of a non-terminal patient with dependent
children. Two cases have actually approved involuntary treatment to
prevent "abandonment" of minor children. Both involved refusal of
blood transfusions on religious grounds, where the patient had a good
prospect of recovery. 31 But courts have upheld the right to end treat-
ment if there is another parent or an extended family to care for the
children.32 The state's interest seems mainly to be discussed by
courts reconfirming the right to refuse treatment in cases where
there are no dependents.33 More significantly, the termination of
treatment cases disproportionately concern patients who, because of
age or because of long-term incapacity, are unlikely to raise this
problem.
(3) The Preservation of Life
The state's interest in the preservation of life similarly appears
more the object of recitation than of application. The United States
Supreme Court noted that the states-like "all civilized nations-
demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a seri-
ous crime." 34 Still, this generalized interest is regularly found to be
outweighed by the patient's "autonomy" right to stop treatment.
Courts weighing the various interests have often disparaged the
state's interest in these cases as a short postponement of the immi-
nent and inevitable.35 Courts also often doubt that the state has any
substantial interest in the preservation of life apart from the interest
of the individual involved. They thus espouse, sometimes explicitly, a
classic liberal conception of the state, going so far in one case to quote
30. E.g. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 684-85 (Ariz. 1987).
31. Application of the President and Dirs. of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
32. See e.g. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E. 2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (a surviving parent);
Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (extended
family). Both cases dealt with blood transfusions refused by Jehovah's Witnesses. In
both the patient's right to refuse treatment was confirmed only after the transfusions
had been administered over the patient's objections and the matter was decided with-
out the threat of anyone's imminent demise.
33. E.g. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 685.
34. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
35. See e.g. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664; Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hospital,
497 N.E. 2d 626, 635 (Mass. 1986). Likewise, state statutes regulating termination of
medical procedures for incompetent patients often require that the patient be in a
terminal condition or in a "persistent vegetative state." E.g. FLA. STAT. §§ 765.302,
765.305 (2005).
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John Stuart Mill. 3 6 Once we have dispensed with claims based on
the rights of doctors or other third parties, the interest of the state in
this self-regarding conduct more or less disappears.
The result of the judicial treatment of these countervailing state
interests is that there is almost no set of circumstances where a com-
petent individual will not have the right to refuse or discontinue any
medical procedure, no matter how effective it promises to be, and no
matter how drastic the consequences of declining it. In one case, a 28
year old woman was held entitled to discontinue a nasogastric feed-
ing tube. She was a quadriplegic suffering from cerebral palsy, bed-
ridden with almost no ability to care for herself and had suffered
several family misfortunes. "She [had] on several occasions ex-
pressed the desire to die."3 7 She was also college educated and, ac-
cording to the court, "intelligent, very mentally competent." Doctors
forecast that removing the tube would create a serious threat to her
life; with it she would probably live another 15 or 20 years.
This characterization of American law must be qualified in one
way. There has been some queasiness about applying the broad right
to discontinue medical treatment to the use of devices to deliver food
and water to the patient. Cutting off these basic requirements of life,
no matter how delivered, raises associations with the everyday com-
forts of eating and drinking, and has therefore, a more powerful emo-
tional impact.38 During the well-publicized controversy over
maintaining a gastrostomy tube for Terri Schiavo, who had been in a
persistent vegetative state for 15 years, the Governor of Florida, com-
plained of "a rush to starve her to death."39 Although medical opin-
ion regards the use of intravenous hydration and tube-delivered
nutrition as extraordinary medical procedures, some studies have
36. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633 ; See also Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P. 2d 375,
384 (Cal. 1993); Fosmire, 551 N.E. 2d at 81-82) (declaring "the State rarely acts to
protect individuals from themselves, indicating that the State's interest is less sub-
stantial when there is little or no risk of direct injury to the public").
37. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299-300 (Cal. Ct. App.1986). See
also Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. 1978). (Approving termination of treat-
ment for a patient who did not fear death but welcome[d] it." Id. at 1234.). See How-
ard Brody, Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts: Moral Equivalence and Double
Effect in Clinical Practice, 82 MINN. L. REV. 929, 939 (1997-98) (discussing refusal of
treatment by suicidal patients).
38. David Orentlicher & Christopher M. Callahan, Feeding Tubes, Slippery
Slopes and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 398-99 nn.70-74 (2004);
James F. Childress, When Is It Morally Justifiable to Discontinue Medical Nutrition
and Hydration? in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-Sus-
TAINING FOOD AND WATER, 67, 73-74 (Joanne Lynn, ed. 1986).
39. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/03/19/national/main681754.shtml (last
visited Jan. 11, 2006); John Schwartz, Neither 'Starvation' Nor the Suffering It Con-
notes Applies to Schiavo, Doctors Say, N.Y. Times, March 25, 2005, at A14.
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found that physicians appear more reluctant to terminate those pro-
cedures, than others such as respirators or dialysis. 4 0
Most courts have refused to make this distinction, treating artifi-
cial hydration and nutrition as medical procedures that may be dis-
continued on the proper consent. The United States Supreme Court
in Cruzan assumed as much.41 There appears to be no appellate
judgment in any jurisdiction in which the termination of life-sus-
taining procedures was denied on the particular ground that the
right to refuse treatment did not extend to the provision of food and
nourishment. 42 Dissenting opinions, however, have sometimes
shown a keen aversion to allowing this kind of death. In a recent
Kentucky judgment a dissenting justice railed that "'removing life-
prolonging treatment from a person who is permanently unconscious'
... all sounds so nice. . ." but "removing food, water and any air from
a living person is an atrocity."43
Such arguments have persuaded some legislatures. For the most
part, statutes authorizing termination of medical treatments for in-
competent patients explicitly include termination of artificial meth-
ods of hydration and nutrition.44 Some later statutes, however,
require more care before authorizing removal of nutrition and hydra-
tion. These range from simply mentioning them separately from
other life-prolonging procedureS45 to restricting the decision makers,
who may consent to "withdraw [all [ofl artificial administration of
food or fluid."46 The Iowa statute excludes provision of nutrition and
hydration from its definition of "life-sustaining procedures," remov-
ing them even from the scope of procedures that might be governed
by the patient's own advance declaration. 47 In the wake of the con-
troversy over Terri Schiavo, many further restrictions on terminating
the provision of food and water have been introduced into state legis-
latures. 48 So far, however, all of these developments, leave un-
touched the near total right of a competent patient to refuse any
medical procedure including the provision of nutrition and hydration.
40. American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, March
15, 1986 quoted in In re Guardianship of Barbara Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 454 (Wash.
1987); Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 38 at 399 nn.70-71.
41. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279, 288-89 (O'Connor, J. concurring), 307 (Brennan J.
joined by Marshall, J. dissenting).
42. That was the conclusion in 1988 of the Maryland Attorney General cited in
Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 756-57 (Md. 1993).
43. Woods, 142 S.W.3d at 99-100 (Wintersheimer, J. dissenting) (Ky. 2004).
44. See, e.g. ALA. CODE. § 22-8A-4 (2005); CAL. PRoB. CODE, § 3200 (West 2000);
FLA. STAT. § 765.101(10) (2005).
45. The North Carolina law provides an authorized, but non-exclusive, form for
an Advanced Health Care Directive that treats "extraordinary means" and "artificial
nutrition and hydration" separately. N.C. GEN STAT.§ 90-321 (d).
46. Aiz. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(D) (2005).
47. IOWA CODE, § 144A.2(8)(b) (2004).
48. Shaila Dewan et al., States Taking a New Look at End-of-Life Legislation,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 2005 at A14.
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IV. REFUSING TREATMENT, SUICIDE, ASSISTED SUICIDE
AND EUTHANASIA
This broad, and largely unqualified, right is difficult to reconcile
with recognition of the countervailing state interest in "preventing
suicide." Courts continue to affirm the importance of the state's pol-
icy against suicide. Unlike the other interests discussed, however,
they do not usually weigh this interest against the right of the indi-
vidual. Instead, they deny that the action contemplated involves any
risk of suicide at all.
In the California case considered above, in which the Court ap-
proved the removal of the feeding tube from a profoundly disabled
woman, it determined that-independently of the mechanical feed-
ing-her life had "been diminished to the point of hopelessness, use-
lessness, unenjoyability and frustration." It was "incongruous, if not
monstrous, for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve
a life that someone else must live, or, more accurately, endure, for '15
to 20 years."' That "decision must ultimately belong to the one whose
life is in issue. . . ." Remarkably, however, the court then denied that
the petitioner was, in effect, asking to commit suicide. Despite its
own sympathetic evaluation of her reasons for not wanting to extend
her life, the court concluded that she had "merely resigned herself to
accept an earlier death, if necessary, rather than live by feedings
forced upon her by means of a nasogastric tube."49 The legal policy
against suicide has also survived in state legislation regulating end-
of-life treatment decisions. These statutes routinely include a section
declaring that nothing in the legislation condones or approves sui-
cide, mercy killing and euthanasia.50
Two common distinctions between suicide and fatal discontinua-
tion of treatment have been asserted. First, courts sometimes pre-
sume that patients in the latter case only want rid themselves of the
medical treatment-not to end their lives. This rationale fits the
judgments upholding the right of a Jehovah's Witness to refuse life-
saving blood transfusions arising while the patients were receiving
other medical treatment. This demonstrated that the patient did not
"wish to die, she wanted to live, but her faith demanded that she re-
fuse blood even at the price of her life.""5 Refusing treatment may be
independent of a desire to die whenever that choice "is reasonably
motivated by a desire to avoid procedures that are in themselves, and
not simply because they prolong a life, physically or emotionally pain-
49. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-06.
50. E.g. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-3210 (2005). A computer search of state statutes
disclosed 24 States with these provisions. An obvious counter-example is the Oregon
law on assisted suicide discussed above.
51. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 279 A.2d at 673.
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ful."5 2 That characterization, however, fails to describe many of the
judgments approving the termination of treatment where the main
objection to the procedure was that it maintained a life that was
painful and without meaningful satisfactions.5 3
The second ground of distinction asserts that suicide and eutha-
nasia are affirmative acts that cause death but stopping a treatment
simply removes an impediment to the progress of the underlying ail-
ment. "Stopping the treatment," as one court said, merely "allows the
delayed meeting with death to take place."5 4 The difficulties with
this distinction are manifest. It supposes an ability to tell the differ-
ence between activities that do and do not interfere with natural
death. It is not clear why the use of hand feeding, heating or air con-
ditioning, or antiseptics, for example, fall into the first category.
It is hard, therefore, to defend a logical distinction between sui-
cide-euthanasia and termination of life-support, at least in the con-
text of the terminal and suffering patient. Some judges and
commentators, however, have expressed reasons of policy for main-
taining these two categories. The prospect of, say, physicians ad-
ministering lethal doses of medicine to willing patients conjures up a
"parade of horribles." These possibilities become more frightening
when placed in the context, to be discussed in the next section, of
unconscious or incompetent patients. Those cases are premised on
what is an essentially fictional assent of the patient to stopping life-
support. What would stop the same kind of fictional consent being
recognized in cases where a court decides an incompetent patient
ought to have consented. Add to this the fuzziness of the very idea of
competence and we have, as one court put it, "the slippery slope with
a vengeance."55
All of these arguments featured in the United States Supreme
Court's rejection of a direct challenge to the distinction between ter-
mination of life support and suicide-euthanasia in two cases decided
in 1997. In both cases the claimants argued the unconstitutionality
of prohibitions on assisted suicide. In the first, Washington v. Gluck-
sberg,5 6 the criminal penalty was argued to be a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. That
provision has been held to require especially pressing state reasons
for restricting conduct within a realm of personal "privacy," meaning,
in this context, the ability to control important and intimate aspects
of one's own life. The Supreme Court had strongly intimated in
Cruzan that this included the traditional right to control one's body
52. Guardianship of Jane Doe, 583 N.E. 2d 1263, 1275 (Mass. 1992) (O'Connor, J.
dissenting).
53. These matters are further discussed in Section 6 below.
54. Donaldson v. Lundgren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
55. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W. 2d 291, 312 (Mich. Ot. App. 2001).
56. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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and, by extension, to refuse medical treatment even if doing so would
hasten the death of the right-holder. Citing that decision, the claim-
ants asserted a "liberty to choose how to die."
The Court held there was no "right to die" in the specially pro-
tected liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment. That rigorous protec-
tion was reserved for rights "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." The right to refuse treatment was well established in
the common law; the right to commit suicide has never been legally
protected-quite the contrary.57 The Court went on to reiterate con-
cerns about the difficulty of limiting such activity to truly voluntary
decisions of competent people. It cited statistics from the Nether-
lands showing that, despite the careful procedures provided in law, in
one year almost 5000 people had received "lethal morphine over-
doses" without having given explicit consent. It worried particularly
about the vulnerability of "severely disabled neonates and elderly
persons suffering dementia."58
The second case, Vacco v. Quill,59dealt even more directly with
the need to distinguish discontinuing life-saving medical treatment
from acts intended to induce death. This time the New York law on
assisted suicide was attacked as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court of Appeals had
held that the state did "not treat equally all competent persons who
are in the final stages of terminal illness and wish to hasten their
deaths" and that this inequality was not rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest.60 The Supreme Court reversed. "[W]e think the
distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment... is both important and logical. . . ." It rehearsed some of
the explanations already surveyed: The assisted suicide is killed by
the medication; the untreated patient by the underlying disease; a
physician assisting suicide "necessarily and indubitably intend[s] pri-
marily that the patient be made dead: the physician who discontin-
ues treatment may intend only to respect the patient's wishes" and
"to cease doing useless and futile things to the patient." The Court
also stressed the basic and immemorial legal distinction between
identical acts undertaken for different reasons.61
It is fair to say that there is now near-unanimous agreement on
two propositions: 1) Acts that end treatment and that will almost cer-
tainly lead to death are lawful and protected by constitutional right;
2) Intentional administration of treatment that will almost certainly
lead to death is not a constitutional right and is, indeed, almost eve-
rywhere unlawful.
57. Id. at 724-25, 727-28.
58. Id. at 734.
59. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
60. Id. at 798-99.
61. Id. at 800-03.
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V. RIGHTS OF INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
Having established these basic propositions, it is necessary to ex-
amine their application to cases in which the individual involved is
either unconscious or without the mental capacity to make his or her
own decisions. As may be imagined, when we are dealing with the
late stages of fatal illness or accident, this is not an uncommon situa-
tion. Such cases, moreover, are more likely to bring the questions
before the courts. As a practical matter, the express wishes of a com-
petent patient in extremis will rarely be disputed by family members
or physician. When the patient is unable to speak for him or herself,
disagreements of the interested parties may be hard to resolve and
the dispute may turn to litigation. Most recent legislation on the con-
ditions for terminating life-support procedures has also been spe-
cially directed at the treatment of incompetent patients.
As with competent patients, the authority to terminate such pro-
cedures has been based on the patient's right to refuse treatment and
not on any right to a speedy or comfortable death. 62 It is treated,
therefore, as an aspect of the right to self-determination. Incompe-
tence, however, is nothing but the incapacity to make decisions.
Speaking of persons incompetent because permanently in coma or in
a persistent vegetative state, Laurence Tribe puts the matter mildly
when he says that "the task of giving content to the notion that [such
persons] have rights in the face of recognition that they could make
no decisions about how to exercise any such rights, remains a difficult
one."63
Nevertheless, courts have wasted little time in presuming that
the right to discontinue treatment may be exercised by a surrogate on
an incompetent's behalf, "[T]he state may not deprive citizens of their
constitutional rights solely because they do not possess the decisional
capacity to personally exercise them."64 The resulting jurisprudence
has been formed-or deformed-by the effort to make surrogate deci-
sion-making consistent with the underlying premise of personal
autonomy.
Both decisional and statutory law now recognize three ways to
make this decision for the patient. Though very widely recognized,
they differ somewhat in content and availability from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.
(1) The most favored procedure for making life-support decisions
for incompetents is the express directive, executed by the patient
when competent. These instructions take various forms and are
given various names: grants of power of attorney, advance health
62. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277-79.
63. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1368 n.25 (Foundation
Press 2d. ed. 1988).
64. Woods, 142 S.W.3d at 32.
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care directives, living wills. They are of two kinds. They may spell
out the circumstances in which particular procedures may be used.
Alternatively, they may designate an individual to make the deci-
sions with or without providing substantive standards for that agent
to apply. Modern state legislation on end-of-life treatment recognizes
the validity of such directives, prescribes minimum standards of con-
tent and procedures for executing them, and regulates the occasions
on which they may be put into effect. Commonly, they also provide
an outline form of such an order that will satisfy the statute's re-
quirements. 65 There appears to be almost no litigation where such
directives have been executed, indicating that they are more or less
universally accepted.
This acceptance is consonant with the idea that the right to re-
fuse treatment is fundamentally that of the individual patient. Ex-
press directives are taken as clear evidence of the circumstances in
which the patient wishes to exercise that right. The easy translation
from advance directive to the patient's right of decision, however, is
not without problems. It assumes that the patient has not changed
his or her mind and that the circumstances are, in relevant respects,
the same as those expected when the directive was formulated. It is
one thing to contemplate this course as an abstract matter far in the
future, and quite another to deal with it as an immediate question.
In one study of terminally ill patients, more than 60 percent sup-
ported physician-assisted suicide in a hypothetical situation, but only
10 percent seriously considered it in their own cases. Of those who
did, about half changed their minds within a few months.66 Even
people whose general views remain the same, cannot anticipate the
exact medical situations in which they may find themselves with re-
spect to the symptoms they may suffer and the kinds of treatments
available.67
Rebecca Dresser has generalized this problem pointing out that
since "illness and injury often produce significant changes in an indi-
vidual's beliefs, values and goals and hence in her interests, conflicts
between past and present interests and perhaps the development of a
new person might not be uncommon." The incompetence itself
reduces the values of "dignity, privacy and bodily integrity so pre-
cious to the competent individual."68 If, in fact, "little psychological
connectedness and continuity exists between the individual at the
65. See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT § 19a-577, PA. CONS. STAT. § 5833 (2005), N.C. GEN
STAT § 90-321 (2005).
66. See Ezekial J. Emanuel, et al., ArITTUDES AND DESIRES RELATED To EUTHANA-
SIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AMONG TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS AND THEIR
CAREGIVERS, 284 JAMA 2460, 2463-65 (2005).
67. Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmi-
ties and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 373, 376 (1986).
68. Id. at 389.
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two points in time, then there is no particular reason why the past
person, as opposed to any other person should determine the present
person's fate."69 These problems are not solved by designating a par-
ticular person to make those decisions. If that person acts under the
patient's prior instructions the same difficulties recur. If the surro-
gate exercises independent judgment the justification of acting in ac-
cordance with the patient's own decisions disappears.
(2) If there are no specific instructions from the patient (or if
those instructions are thought insufficient), the law still insists that
the decision on termination be attributed to the patient. This re-
quires employment of a "substituted judgment." The term has no ca-
nonical meaning but I will use it to mean replicating the decision that
the patient would make if competent. The focus, as one court de-
scribed it, "must always be on what the patient would say if asked
today whether the treatment in issue should be terminated."70
Many of the doubts already discussed about the reliability of ex-
press advance directives also trouble this more flexible standard.
Courts have varied with respect to the detail that they require for
confirming such decisions as those of the patient. In In re Quinlan, an
important early case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided,
without any individualized inquiry, that it was enough to defer to the
"best judgment" of the patient's "guardian and family."71 Likewise,
some statutes rely only on the relationship of the appointed decision-
makers to the incompetent patient.72 Reasoning that it is better to
err on the side of preserving a patient's life, other courts have been
more demanding, requiring that termination be supported by evi-
dence of the patient's prior expressed intent.78 In Cruzan, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Missouri
Supreme Court's requirement that an expressed intent of the incom-
petent be proven by "clear and convincing evidence." 74
Most courts are willing to attribute a desire to terminate to an
incompetent patient even without proof of declarations, formal or in-
formal, on his or her views. Where there are no clear instructions,
Florida law imposes a duty on the surrogate to make only those deci-
sions "which he or she believes the principal would have made under
the circumstances." 75 The judgment should be based on an overall
assessment of the experience and values of the patient and an esti-
mate of how they would be applied in the present circumstances. A
69. Id. at 380-81.
70. Matter of Westchester County Med. Ctr. On Behalf Of O'Connor, 72 N.Y. 2d
517, 530 (1988).
71. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
72. E.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. 90.322(b) (2005).
73. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 534 N.Y.D.2d at 530-31.
74. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268-69.
75. FLA. STAT. § 765.205(1)(b) (2005).
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recent codification asks the health care surrogate to "base these deci-
sions on the surrogate's knowledge of the patient's values."76 Courts
have called for evidence on the "patient's philosophical, religious and
moral views, life goals, values, about the purpose of life and the way
it should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedure,
suffering and death."77 On other occasions, "the impact on [the] fam-
ily; the probability of adverse side effects; and the prognosis with or
without treatment must be considered."78 It is evident that these nu-
merous and elastic factors, applied in different situations, may liber-
ate judgment as much as they constrain it.
No matter how well the surrogate decision-maker knows the pa-
tient, it is doubtful if the patient's own preferences in a particular
situation are reproducible by someone else. In one study, individuals
were asked how they would like to be treated in described circum-
stances. When potential agents were presented with these scenarios
their predictions of the principals' responses were not accurate to a
statistically significant degree.79 At the end, the actual decision-
maker (and any court reviewing the decision) may end up making his
or her own determination about what, all things considered, is best
for the patient and for other interested parties.80
(3) Such "substituted judgment," begins to merge into the third
recognized ground for deciding among treatment alternatives for an
incompetent patient-the patient's "best interests." Some judicial
decisions and statutory schemes directly invoke this best interests
standard. Others prohibit termination resulting in death unless
there is at least some evidence of the patient's own preferences. In
many jurisdictions, best interest is demoted to a kind of "last resort"
criterion to be employed only when there is no advance directive and
no grounds for inferring the patient's preferences.8 1 Even then, reli-
ance on best interests is sometimes associated with the patient's own
choices. 82 Since people generally choose to pursue their own best in-
terests, it makes sense to attribute to the incompetent patient a pref-
erence for the decision that a good faith decision-maker feels to be in
the patient's best interests.
76. ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 36-3203(C) (2005).
77. Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 758 (Md. 1993) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
78. Brophy, 497 N.E. 2d at 631 (numbering omitted).
79. David Orentlicher, The Limits of Legislation, 53 Md. L. Rev. 1255, 1278
(1994).
80. JOHN GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 112-122 (1996).
81. E.g. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-3203 (C) (2005). See also Uniform Health-Care De-
cisions Act, § 5(f) (1994) http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (follow "Final Acts and Legis-
lation"; then follow "Select a Title, Health Care-Decisions Act"). For an unusual
judicial statement of the idea that best interests should be considered instead of a
supposed reference to the patient's desires see the dissenting opinion of Justice Ste-
vens in the Cruzan case. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 338. See also Dresser, supra note 83.
82. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664-65.
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There are situations, however, where even this attenuated sense
of the patient's own choice must be abandoned. Those are the cases of
patients born with an incompetency that precludes an appreciation of
their own situation or the formulation of standards of a good life. Re-
course to the patient's own desires in such cases is meaningless. This
puzzle did not deter the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in
the well-known case of Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz.83 The patient in that case was a 67 year old man with "an
IQ of ten and a mental age of approximately two years and eight
months." Even then, the Court insisted that the objective was to rep-
licate the "decision which would be made by the incompetent person,
if that person were competent, but taking into account the present
and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which
would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the com-
petent person."84 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has rec-
ognized the futility of any attempt to capture such a patient's
preferences. In one case, it quoted an expert witness who asked, "if it
snowed all summer would it then be winter?"85
The fact of incompetency complicates any objective determina-
tion of best interests. The best interests of such a person are differ-
ent from those of a competent person and harder for the decision-
maker to appreciate. Problems become acute where the incompe-
tence is a result of permanent unconsciousness or a persistent vege-
tative state. In such circumstances a person has "no mental life at all
and [is] thus unable to have any positive or negative experiences." 8 6
"Without awareness, expectation, beliefs, desires, aim and purpose, a
being can have no interests; without interests he [or she] cannot be
benefited ... 87 It is hard to know just what a decision-maker is
supposed to weigh in those circumstances.
There are less total kinds of incompetencies where, for example,
the patient can experience pain, pleasure, warmth or cold. Such per-
sons can often express their feelings and preferences by speech or
otherwise. The retarded patient in Saikewicz, for example, was able
to use "gestures and grunts to make his wishes known to others and
respond[ed] only to gestures or physical contacts."88 "The more men-
tally complex an individual is," Rebecca Dresser notes, "the more
83. 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
84. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
85. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981).
86. See Dresser, supra note 67 at 384 (citing President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, De-
ciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment).
87. Id. at 383, 383 n.58 (quoting JOEL FEINBERG, THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS AND
UNBORN GENERATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIs 43, 61 (W. Black-
stone ed. 1974). See also, Garvey, supra note 80 at 114 (raising same issue with re-
spect to children).
88. SAIKEwIcz, 370 N.E. 2d at 420.
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complex are her interests and the more numerous are the conditions
that must be met if she is to live well."8 9
In all of these situations, deciding which course of treatment fur-
thers the patient's best interests (real or constructed) requires some
forecast of the circumstances that would follow each alternative.
This must mean that the decision-maker decides whether it would be
better for the patient to live the kind of life available to him or her if
treatment is maintained - or to be dead. Notwithstanding the pro-
tests of some courts that decisions must not be based on negative
judgments as to the value of an impaired person's life,90 there really
appears to be no other way to make the treatment choice. The third
party decision-maker must decide if it would be in the best interests
of a patient to be dead and, if so, what action should be taken to effec-
tuate that decision. It is hard to see this as anything but euthanasia.
By the same token, when the competent patient makes the same deci-
sion for him or herself, it is hard to see it as anything but suicide.
VI. THE LAW IN BooKs AND THE LAW IN ACTION
Much modern American jurisprudence has been premised on the
distinction between "law in books" and "law in action." Studying the
latter meant looking at what the legal system actually did rather
than what legislators and judges said it did.91 Few phenomena illus-
trate the distinction better than the subject of this report. American
law, with rare exceptions, has set its face against euthanasia, as-
sisted suicide and suicide. At the same time it has emphatically en-
dorsed a patient's right to terminate treatments or procedures, even
when termination will speedily lead to death. In many states, moreo-
ver, this right may be exercised for incompetent patients by third
parties who make a good faith determination that the patient's best
interests require the action or inaction that will lead to death. Given
this state of the law, decisions are made everyday to end of the lives
of men and women suffering from various degrees of pain, discomfort,
incapacity or humiliation, based on a conclusion that the lives in
prospect are not worth living. Two conceptual devices have been
deployed to rationalize this result. Each distinguishes lethal termi-
nation of life-sustaining treatment from murder and suicide.
89. Dresser, supra note 67 at 384 n.66.
90. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 742. See also Woods, 142 S.W. 3d at 90-91
(Wintersheimer, J. dissenting). As in the case of competent patients a third party
decision to terminate treatment resulting in death may be limited by the same kind of
state interests discussed in Section 3. These are sometimes defined in controlling
legislation as by denying such an alternative to a pregnant woman. See e.g. GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-32-3 (2004) (stating in the living will that where a female has been diag-
nosed as pregnant the living will have no force or effect unless the fetus is not viable).
91. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REV. 12 (1910).
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The first distinction has already been noted. Ending medical
treatment does not itself cause death. Most judicial discussions of
this point track the New Jersey Supreme Court's statement in In re
Conroy that "declining life-sustaining medical treatment may not be
properly viewed as an attempt to commit suicide. Refusing medical
intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course
.. ". 92 Similarly, the relevant Uniform Act proposed to the States by
the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Ameri-
can Bar Association refers to termination decisions as "health-care"
decisions like choosing between laparoscopic or conventional sur-
gery.93 Statutes allow the removal of only "artificial" or "extraordi-
nary" medical assistance. A fairly common locution used in defining
these methods refers to things that "serve only to prolong the dying
process."94
This supposes that withholding or removing life-sustaining pro-
cedures merely restores some natural status quo and as such cannot
itself be a wrongful act. According to the California Court of Appeal,
in mechanical respiration or nutrition, "each pulsation. . . or each
drop of fluid introduced into the patient's body . .. is comparable to a
manually administered injection or item of medication." Therefore,
disconnecting a machine was analogous to withholding an injection or
dose of medicine-an "omission rather than an affirmative act."
"[T] here is no criminal liability for failure to act unless there is a duty
to act."95 The United States Supreme Court has also averted to the
"line between 'killing' and 'letting die,"' a "distinction widely recog-
nized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal tradi-
tions... [and one that] comports with fundamental legal principles of
causation and intent."96
It is understandable that advocates of legal assisted suicide fail
to see the relevance of these differences. In the first place, the doctor
does not merely stand by when a procedure is terminated. Removal
of a respirator or gastrostomy tube requires at least some planning
and degree of skill. Beyond this, it is not difficult to raise hypotheti-
cal cases in which a technical difference between action and inaction
has no intuitive appeal. Concurring in Cruzan, Justice Scalia noted
92. 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985). See also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 798, 801
(1996); In re Farrell, 108 529 A. 2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987) (citing cases from other juris-
dictions to the same effect).
93. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1994) http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (fol-
low "Final Acts and Legislation"; then follow "Select a Title, Health Care-Decisions
Act").
94. E.g. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(8) (2005); D.C. CODE § 7-621(3) (2005); MiN. STAT.
§ 145B.02(8) (2005).
95. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. App. Ct. 1983). The
court also decided that the physician, unlike a parent who is obliged to feed a child,
was under no duty to provided non-beneficial care. Id. at 490.
96. Vacco, 521 U.S. 801.
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that "lilt would not make much sense to say that one may not kill
oneself by walking into the sea, but may sit on the beach until sub-
merged by the incoming tide."9 7
It is true that, the distinction between action and omission has
been a powerful presence in common law determination of liability,
both criminal and civil.98 Its persistence may reflect some idea that
inaction often can be explained by inadvertence or mistake, while
positive actions are, more generally, intentional. The latter, there-
fore, may appear more culpable.99 While that generalization may be
valid for many categories of action, the "inactions" in end-of-life cases
are the consequences of careful, indeed painfully deliberate, deci-
sions. In this context, the differential legal treatment of misfeasance
and nonfeasance seems contrived.
The intentionality of termination of treatment raises the second
frequently cited defense for distinguishing it from euthanasia and su-
icide. That is the "principle of double effect." This idea, commonly
associated with Roman Catholic moral theology, generally declares it
permissible to perform an act that can be foreseen to have an evil
effect if it is undertaken for the purpose of achieving a proper ef-
fect.100 In a standard example, a pilot bombs a village in order to
destroy a munitions factory, thus shortening a war and saving lives.
Although it is foreseeable that innocent civilians will be killed, the
action is morally justifiable under the doctrine of double effect.' 0 ' In
the end-of-life context, the principle has been cited to support the ad-
ministration of pain medicine even where it will hasten the patient's
death.102
Courts have used similar reasoning in reviewing termination of
treatment. In deciding that such actions do not implicate the state's
interest in preventing suicide they deny that the patient has the in-
97. 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990). Justice Scalia went on to suggest that a more sensi-
ble line was between "'ordinary' care and those that consist of sustaining from 'exces-
sive' or 'heroic' measures." Id. His skepticism may have been diminished by 1997
when he joined the majority opinion in Vacco v. Quill relying in part on the traditional
legal distinction between action and inaction. See also Brody, supra, note 37 at 941-
42.
98. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 190-205 (2d ed.
1960); W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 373-85
(5th ed. 1984).
99. See Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito- The Principle of Double Effect in Ameri-
can Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REv. 469, 506-07 (2005); Richard Kay, The State
Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction and the Independence of Constitutional
Law, 10 CONST. COMM. 329, 354-57 (1993).
100. See generally Lucius I. IGORGI, THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL OF ITS TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND ITS MODERN REINTERPRETATION
(1985).
101. Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions and Consequences: the Doctrine of
Double Effect, 18 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 334, 334 n.3 (1989).
102. See e.g. State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213-15 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). Stat-
utes frequently re-affirm the rights of patients to palliative care. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 765.102 (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.32 (2005).
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tention to end his or her life. The patient intends only to remove the
respirator or feeding tube, even though death will surely follow.
This, according to some courts, is not the same as desiring death. Pa-
tients making this choice "may fervently wish to live, but to do so free
of unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs, and without pro-
tracted suffering."103 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a compe-
tent quadriplegic patient's right to discontinue use of a respirator, an
action that the trial court found "would shortly prove fatal."104 The
Court declared that the patient "did not wish to commit suicide. He
desired only to live for as long as his state of health would permit
without artificial augmentation and support." 0 5 In distinguishing
termination of treatment and palliative medication from assisted sui-
cide, the United States Supreme Court specifically referred to the
fact that the former actions "may have the foreseen but unintended
'double effect' of hastening death." 06
The doctrine of double effect in this context is burdened with se-
rious difficulties. Most formulations of that principle impose a con-
straint of proportionality whereby the good of the intended object is
not outweighed by the evil of the unintended one. 07 Such an analy-
sis would measure the injuries imposed by the unwanted treatments
and compare them to the evil of hastening the patient's death. This
comparison involves staggering difficulties but, in any event, no court
seems to have seriously attempted it. In the case of patients lacking
consciousness, it cannot be said that intravenous hydration or a feed-
ing tube is a problem, independent of the fact that they are extending
the patient's life. Even in other cases, the physical discomfort of
these devices has not been described as horrific. 08
Most descriptions of the doctrine also deny its applicability
where the evil consequence is the means of securing the good one. 09
If someone bribes an official to secure funding for a hospital, the bribe
is not justified by saying that it was only the hospital that was really
desired. In the example of the bombing of the munitions plant, if the
pilot does not intend to shorten the war by reducing the enemy's ca-
pacity to make weapons, but rather to subvert enemy morale by kill-
ing civilians, the wrong is not excused by the principle of double
effect." 0 There is a difference between easing a patient's discomfort
103. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224.
104. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990).
105. Id. at 627.
106. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 808, n.11.
107. Warren Quinn, supra note 101 at 334 n.3.
108. David Major, The Medical Procedures for Providing Food and Water: Indica-
tions and Effects in By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS, supra note 38, 21, 26.
109. See IGORGI, supra note 100 at 27, 38; Edward C. Lyons, supra note 99 at 482.
110. Warren Quinn, supra, note 101 at 348. Cf Brody, supra note 37 at 946.
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by stopping a painful procedure and easing that discomfort by "mak-
ing that patient die.""'
More seriously, in many termination of treatment cases, it is spe-
cious to say that death is unintended. That explanation makes sense
in administration of pain medication that is foreseeably lethal.112 It
is also true where the decision to terminate life support is genuinely
directed to the treatment, independent of its role in keeping the pa-
tient alive. One can imagine treatments that are unrelievedly pain-
ful or that subject the patient to unbearable humiliation. We might
then truthfully say that we regret the patient's death, but the re-
jected medical procedure itself presented an even greater evil."13 But
this reasoning does not apply to many decisions to cease a life-sus-
taining procedure. Often what the patients or the families want to
end are lives so impoverished and hopeless that they are judged not
worth living.114 Despite repeated rejection of suicide and euthanasia,
judicial decisions approving the right to such terminations make
clear the judges' own sympathies with this judgment. The miserable
existence suffered by the patient (apart form the procedure to be en-
ded) is often described in heart-breaking detail.
At the end, the American law in action is not unlike that in many
other jurisdictions.115 The taking of life is forbidden whether by the
individual him or herself, or by another person. The former is not
excused by pleading his or her own rights of autonomy; the latter is
not excused because motivated by concern for the individual's wel-
fare. But there are exceptions. These are generally reserved for
cases where there is a good faith basis for determining that the qual-
ity of the lives to be ended has been grossly diminished-because of
pain or incapacity-and there is no reasonable prospect that this con-
dition can be reversed. In such circumstances, the actions leading to
termination may be performed by the individual affected or-where
that person is unable to articulate a preference-in good faith by a
limited class of people who may be presumed have the patient's wel-
fare in mind. Perhaps out of fear that other interests may improperly
influence the decision, third parties may not act in to assist dying in
111. VAcco, 521 U.S. at 808.
112. But see Brody, supra, note 37 at 948 (questioning the need, in most cases, for
lethal doses of analgesic in order to relieve pain).
113. See Guardianship of Jane Doe, 583 N.E. 2d 1263, 1275 (Mass. 1992)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Edward Lyons defends the double effect justification for
terminating life support without questioning the genuineness of the claim that it is
only the procedures that the decision-maker wishes to end. See Edward Lyons, supra
note 99 at 544-47.
114. See Glucksberg ,521 U.S. at 746-47 (Stevens, J concurring).
115. See generally REGULATION OF CIVIL LAW TO SAFEGUARD THE AUTONOMY OF PA-
TIENTS AT THE END OF THEIR LIFE: AN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION (Jochen
Taupitz, ed., 2000).
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any other way.' 16 Naturally, there can be honest and deeply held
differences over whether the right conditions obtain in a given case,
but that is not unique to this category of legal decision.
What distinguishes American law is its rhetorical commitment
to the sanctity of all life and its rejection of the idea that some lives
are not worth living.117 The litigated cases involving a decision to
allow the patient to die are therefore premised not on a right to die or
a right to take life in defined circumstances, but on the right to con-
trol one's own body by refusing medical treatment. This obfuscation
has been far from easy, as the cases attempting to apply the right to
people without decision-making capacity illustrate. Relatively recent
statutory regulations are more direct in specifying the appropriate
circumstances in which life-saving treatment may be discontinued. A
few, moreover expressly refer to the right at issue as one "to a peace-
ful and natural death."118 Generally, they obscure matters, however,
by founding their options expressly on the right to make decisions
about medical treatment"r9 and condemning suicide or euthana-
sia.120 If we suppose that the rules are really being formulated to
control what are, in pith and substance, life-ending actions, this ap-
proach can only confuse judgment.
The common law, however, has never been a slave to rationality.
Perhaps its leading characteristic has been its capacity to adapt doc-
trines developed in one context to rather different circumstances. Its
inherent conservatism manifests itself in its reluctance to abandon
old categories and concepts even when they cease to speak to contem-
porary problems. Instead it simply declares that they apply to new
and apparently inapt instances. A injured child who trespassed on
property to which he was attracted by a dangerous situation should
have an action for damages against the property owner. So although
entirely unknown to the owner, he became an "invitee."121 Henry
Maine described the likely reasons for such circumlocutions in his
discussion of legal fictions: "They satisfy the desire for improvement,
which is not quite wanting, at the same time that they do not offend
the superstitious disrelish for change which is always present."122
116. The sole exception is the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 127.800 - 127.890 (2005). That law speaks to the needs to limit such actions to
cases of seriously reduced quality of life and to avoid improper influence by specifying
an elaborate procedure to be followed before a lethal prescription may be written. Id.
117. See John Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance, University of Texas
School of Law Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers, No. 72, 22-24, http://
ssrn.com/abstract=692901 (visited Jan. 11, 2006).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(a) (2005).
119. E.g. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, Prefatory Note, §1(6); FLA. STAT.
§765.102(1) (2005).
120. E.g. ARIz. REV. STAT. §36-3210 (2005); MINN. STAT. §145B.15 (2005); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.639 (Lexis 2005).
121. KEETON ET. AL., supra note 98 at, 69-72.
122. HENRY SUMNER MANE, ANCIENT LAw 25 (Henry Holt 1874) (1869).
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Maine seemed to think that, as law became more rational, a more
clear-headed process of legal change would emerge1 23 and with re-
gard to many areas of regulation he was right.
But the law on compassionate death shows that there may be
other reasons for maintaining disingenuous descriptions of legal de-
vices. Notwithstanding what appears to be a widespread practice of
allowing individuals or families to decide that a certain life should
not continue, an overt adoption of that policy would engage passion-
ate political and moral differences. Explicit legal machinery for end-
ing lives would be in tension with what has come to be called the
"culture of life." That policy has been associated with opposition to
abortion, to human cloning and, more recently, to stem-cell re-
search.124 For many Americans, it has been important to be able to
end the suffering of loved ones while clinging to a belief in the sanc-
tity of life. If the current state of the law is not a result of that diffi-
culty, it certainly helps to relieve it.125
The cost, as students of legal fictions have pointed out,12 6 is ob-
scurity in the governing rules and obstacles to articulating a policy
better reflecting considered judgments as to the circumstances in
which the deliberate ending of life is acceptable. With the exception
of cases in which those closest to the patient are in disagreement,
however, the current state of affairs seems to yield results that are
widely felt to be tolerable. For many people, a more direct route to a
similar state of affairs would require a painful examination of their
personal and social values, as well as extended contemplation of their
mortality. Avoiding that may be worth a muddled law.127
123. See generally id. at 21.
124. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/achievement/chapl5.htm (last visited Jan.
11, 2006). The idea might more properly be defined as a concern for innocent human
life as its advocates tend to be strong proponents of capital punishment. See Ronald
Brown Stein, 'CULTURE OF LIFE' ISSUES SPLIT GOP. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 28,
2005, at Al.
125. "[T]he judges do not have to put the utilitarian analysis down on paper; they
do not want to say things about the incompetent that no one wants to say; things
reflecting an attitude that the incompetent is something less than a person-or some-
thing less than alive." Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 1, 61 (1990).
126. See generally Pound, supra note 91 ; Harmon, supra note 125 at 63 n.260
("[T]hose deeply disturbing moral issues should be examined by the light of day, not
hidden in the dark.")
127. See Robertson, supra note 117 at 18 (noting that legal obfuscation in this case
results from being caught "between Louis Brandeis' dictum that 'the best disinfectant
is sunlight' and T.S.Eliot's reminder that 'humankind cannot bear too much reality.').
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